The Political Essays of William Shaler

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William Shaler is a shadowy figure in the annals of early American foreign policy. Known in his lifetime as an author and a merchant who undertook diplomatic missions to Algiers, Cuba, and Mexico for the administrations of James Madison and Andrew Jackson, Shaler, in the twentieth century, was remembered in two ways. One was as an ideologue who sought to spread enlightened democratic republicanism throughout the Americas and elsewhere. This interpretation, favored by Roy Franklin Nichols, depicted Shaler as an "advance agent" for the expansion of American ideas and influence, especially in Spanish America where he planted seeds that came to fruition in later nineteenth-century Pan-American schemes. The other was a more sinister portrait of Shaler as a secret government agent who promoted a filibuster—the celebrated and colorful Gutiérrez-Magee raid of 1812-1813 into Spanish Texas—for the Madison administration. These descriptions of Shaler were not necessarily contradictory. To the extent that both seemed plausible, they were combined in ways to reinforce a broader impression: that the ideologue and the agent, in thought and in deed, anticipated America's future as a hemispheric and a world power.

For several reasons, that impression requires modification. One is that it is simply inaccurate to interpret Shaler's involvement in the Gutiérrez-Magee raid as proof of Madison's desire to acquire Texas. Another is that there remains little value in continuing to describe Shaler's thinking merely as an early anticipation of Pan-Americanism or American world power. Some of the agent's main concerns were more global in nature than they were exclusively American, yet at the same time it would not be entirely accurate to say that Shaler envisaged the United States itself as a world power. His position was more complex. The evidence for these latter arguments may be found in six essays Shaler wrote on Spanish-American and world affairs while he was on his mission to Mexico in 1812-1813. Their contents are significant insofar as they represent an early attempt to provide a comprehensive and
systematic outline of the future of the American hemisphere at a time when the Spanish empire seemed poised on the brink of collapse. But Shaler's essays also suggest that even as their author peered into the future, the originating impulses of his ideas remained firmly rooted in the past, specifically in the eighteenth-century backgrounds of American republicanism, European mercantilism, and the law of nations.

The genesis of Shaler's essays can be found in the instructions he received from the Madison administration in 1810. The agent's ostensible task was to promote trade and consular services in the Gulf Coast region, and he was also to gather information on Cuba and Mexico as these colonies moved toward independence. Should either break with Spain, Shaler was to contact its successor regime to spread American goodwill and to discuss trade and other matters of mutual interest. More particularly, when in Cuba, Shaler was to raise the issue of whether the island might be incorporated into the Union, conveying at the same time the message that "no idea would be admissible of placing it . . . in a dependence on any other foreign power." Both Cubans and Mexicans were also to be informed that Spanish East and West Florida must eventually become part of the United States, but on the disputed southwestern boundary of Louisiana and the future of Texas, Shaler was directed to say no more than that Madison wished to negotiate with the Mexicans in "a spirit of amity and equity."

As for the gathering of information, the administration provided very detailed guidelines. Shaler was to ascertain Cuban and Mexican attitudes "not only towards the United States but in reference to the great nations of Europe, and to the Commercial and other connections with them respectively, and generally to inquire into the state, the characteristics and the proportions as to numbers, intelligence and wealth of the several parties, the amount of population, the extent and organization of the military force and the pecuniary resources including the product of the mines." If circumstances required, the agent could even extend his inquiries and travels as far afield as Santa Fe and Peru, but in all cases his communications were to be "full and frequent." He was also given a cipher code for use "as occasion
Shaler was a conscientious agent. Aware that Cuba and Mexico were regions "very little known to us," he announced that his correspondence would "necessarily be voluminous" and declared that he would "take the liberty of communicating such facts as do not require secrecy, or are not strictly of an official nature by myself, in the travelling epistolary style." Shaler sent little information requiring "secrecy"—he used code for a communication only once—but he mailed to Washington nearly 150 letters between June 1810 and December 1813. Among them were the six essays. Each essay is complete in itself, but collectively they represent an effort to go beyond the letters. They can thus provide a synthesis of the agent's thinking about the problems of Spanish-American independence, the future relations of the United States with Latin America, and the relationship between the Americas and the world at large.

After reaching Cuba in August 1810, Shaler filled his letters with information for the State Department, including newspapers and documents issued by Spanish officials. From this material, an early version of what became the second of Shaler's essays emerged in Havana on July 19, 1811, in "a note drawn up on the spur of the moment" for the purpose of delineating "some of the leading advantages that characterize this Island." On that occasion Shaler forwarded observations on the geography, resources, and climate of Cuba. He concluded with a warning about the advantages that would accrue to Great Britain if that nation acquired Cuba and the threat this development would pose to the United States. Several weeks later, after Shaler had been arrested on November 8, 1811, and ordered to leave, he composed some impressions of Cuban customs, describing them as "a sketch of the condition of society here, and of such of the characters most distinguished for power, fortune, responsibility, or talents as I have been able to obtain a knowledge of." This was enclosed in his dispatch of November 25, 1811, and it later became the basis for the fourth of his essays.

As he departed Havana, Shaler regretted he had not sent more information. "I am aware," he wrote Secretary of State James Monroe, "that the President may expect from me a report on the
population, revenues, military strength and general resources of Cuba, but I hope that the nature of my situation here will be admitted as sufficient reason for not doing it, it has never given me an opportunity of estimating anything near correctness on these points. Circumstances arising out of the times and the jealousy of this government have absolutely cut me off from all intercourse with the sources of information since my residence here. So situated, [it] would have been imprudent and foolish in me to show curiosity on such subjects. It was this omission that Shaler then repaired by writing four essays in New Orleans between January and March 1812, shortly before he left for Natchitoches, Louisiana, in an effort to enter Mexico in fulfillment of his 1810 instructions.

After reaching New Orleans on December 21, 1811, Shaler commenced a new series of letterbooks for his correspondence. He began the first of three such books with a December 27, 1811, report of his return to the United States and mentioned that Orleans territorial governor William C. C. Claiborne had suggested he go to Natchitoches to seek information on Mexico. While considering this, Shaler distilled impressions from his stay in Havana. He then drafted an essay on the Spanish-American struggle for independence with particular reference to the Mexican revolution, heading it "No. 1 'Essays on the Revolution in So. America.'" The contents discussed the dangers of British intervention in Mexico, and Claiborne, to whom Shaler gave the essay for mailing to Washington, forwarded it to Navy secretary Paul Hamilton on January 23, 1812. In his covering letter, the governor described the author as "Committing to paper (but not with a view to publication) his Ideas of the importance of Cuba to the United States, & the advantages which would result from the Independence of Mexico."

On February 1, 1812, Claiborne forwarded to Hamilton "two other numbers upon the subject of Cuba & other possessions of Spain in America," and the governor identified "My friend Captain Shaler lately arrived hence from Havana" as their author. For the second of these essays Shaler expanded the report on the climate, geography, and resources of Cuba he had sent to Washington on July 19, 1811. He also dwelled at greater length on the dangers of a British occupation of Cuba. Shaler pursued the
implications of that subject in the third essay, discussing the extent to which Cuba could maintain its independence and whether its future lay as a separate nation, as a part of the Union, or as part of Mexico. These papers he numbered as the second and third of the essays on "the Revolution in So. America."

For his fourth essay, Shaler reworked the remarks on Havana society he had sketched in November 1811, heading them "Notes on Manners and Society in Havana Cuba." Presumably, he also intended to give this essay to Claiborne for delivery to Washington, though no evidence survives that he did so or that Claiborne forwarded it. Nevertheless, the contents of the fourth essay suggest that it was a sequel to the third essay on South American revolutions. Where the latter essay had asked whether Cuba could survive as an independent nation, the essay on Havana discussed whether Cubans themselves had the attributes to sustain independence. On neither score was Shaler wholly optimistic. He still worried that Great Britain or France might seize Cuba, and he was concerned how far the burden of the colonial (and Roman Catholic) past might inhibit Cubans from developing their potential. Still, Shaler was not without hope. Increased contact, commercial and cultural, between Cuba and the United States would promote change, and under "a liberal government & enlightened system of policy," Cubans could "very soon take the rank among men that nature has so well qualified them to hold."

Shaler's fifth essay was probably written in early August 1812, after the advance guard of the Gutiérrez-Magee filibuster entered Texas on August 8, 1812, and while Shaler was recovering from a short illness. It was enclosed in his August 18 letter to Monroe. The version Monroe received was untitled, but Shaler headed his own copy: "Reflections on the means of restoring the political balance and procuring a general peace to the world." This paper is the only previously known Shaler essay. It was published, without its title, in 1933 by Joseph B. Lockey, who regarded its advocacy of a series of confederated American states as evidence for a strand of "Pan-American" ideology that could be found in the thinking of many of the liberators of the Spanish-American colonies, most notably Simón
Neither Lockey or Nichols had access to the title Shaler provided for his fifth essay, yet it is the title that provides an essential clue for its meaning. It should also be stressed that Shaler hoped the Madison administration would adopt ideas from this essay for inclusion in a peace treaty ending the war with Great Britain and, beyond that, in any general peace settlement that might conclude the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. The essay revealed a keen understanding of the connections between these two conflicts, with Shaler predicting that France and the United States were more likely to emerge as victors than were Great Britain and Spain. Indeed, Spain and its empire were already as good as lost, and Shaler’s response was to fashion his own solution to the needs of both the United States and the nations of Europe in a new world order whose contours he also sketched. At first sight, this solution—which might be described as a synthesis between republicanism and the law of nations—seems novel in the extreme, but a closer reading suggests that in its underlying assumptions it was probably more derivative than original and that if these assumptions had any single inspiration, it was probably the writings of Emmerich de Vattel.

In his widely read 1758 treatise, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, Vattel had described the concert of Europe as “a sort of Republic,” grounded in the balance of power, in which every nation shared a “common interest” in the “maintenance of order and the preservation of liberty” by observing treaty obligations as binding law. The career of Napoleon had destroyed the eighteenth-century balance, but Vattel’s vision of a “republican” international order resting on an equilibrium created by law-giving treaties continued to have appeal. The formation of “lawful” alliances and confederations of roughly equal strength, Vattel had argued, “would be a sure means of preserving the balance of power and thus maintaining the liberty of Nations.” The reorganization of the Americas and the plans for Spain’s Pacific Ocean colonies sketched in Shaler’s fifth essay conform to this ideal. Even

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Shaler's hope that Great Britain and the United States might form a "coalition" or a "Union in friendship" to secure the liberties of nations may have owed something to Vattel. In 1758, the Swiss philosopher had celebrated "Happy England," whose situation as an island nation "relieve[d] her of the necessity of maintaining at great expense the instruments of despotism" and thus permitted her "to hold in her hands the political scales." In the world order about to emerge, Shaler anticipated the return of a happier England, free from the misrule of its "infatuated ministry and an imbecille prince," which could then serve as a suitable partner for the United States in peace.

If so, how far should Shaler's ideas be characterized as "Pan-American" or as a blueprint for American world power? Their resemblance to Bolivar's Pan-Americanism is, at best, superficial. In 1813, the Liberator called for the union of "all South America into a single national body" so that "one central government" might "direct its great resources toward a single goal, namely resistance to all foreign attacks" and especially "the aggressions which European ambitions might instigate." Shaler, by contrast, sought no such union, did not believe that all states in the postwar Americas would be independent, and even allowed that some would belong to a reorganized British empire. Moreover, in August 1812 Shaler assumed that France would accomplish "her views of Universal dominion," particularly if Napoleon defeated Russia and absorbed the Ottoman empire. Under such circumstances, the agent believed that it would require the combined efforts of an expanded United States and an enlarged British empire in both Asia and the Pacific Ocean to provide countervailing forces to preserve world peace. In so arguing, Shaler certainly anticipated that the United States would play a greater role in world affairs, but it was in a world in which the United States itself was far from being a dominant power.

Shaler's sixth essay dates from mid-1813. It was written shortly before he departed for Texas on July 20 to replace José Bernardo Maximiliano Gutiérrez de Lara with José Álvarez de Toledo as head of the filibuster into Mexico, the action that earned him a reprimand from the Madison administration and
led to the termination of his mission. On this occasion, Shaler kept no copy nor did he provide the essay with a title. Instead, he wrote out one version and mailed it to Navy secretary William Jones. Shaler would have had no difficulty in composing the text. He had already addressed its subject—American trade in the Pacific—in a published account of his 1804 voyage between California and Canton. There Shaler had provided an outline of the population and resources of California and the extent to which the latter might be traded to Canton. He concluded that Spanish officials, by acts of omission and commission, had done "every thing that could be done to render California an object worthy the attention of the great maritime powers: they have placed it in a situation to want nothing but a good government to rise rapidly to wealth and importance."

In 1804, Shaler stopped short of advocating the annexation of California, hinting only that "the conquest of this country would be absolutely nothing; it would fall without an effort to the most inconsiderable force." Eight years later, in August 1812, Shaler still assumed that California would remain a province of Mexico, even after its Pacific trade, along with that of Peru and Chile, came under the control of Great Britain following the collapse of Spain. In 1813, however, Shaler revised these earlier views by urging the United States to seek California for itself, both to pre-empt Russian and British expansion on the Pacific coast and to increase its own trade across the Pacific by replacing Great Britain as the future carrier of the maritime commerce of Mexico. Some of Shaler's contemporaries had already predicted that American settlers would eventually spread across the continent, forming, as John Quincy Adams hoped, "one nation, speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and political principles," or, as Thomas Jefferson believed, breaking into a series of independent sister republics. Shaler's emphasis was very different. He put forward, instead, an unambiguous case for the American acquisition of California, justifying it with arguments drawn from the ideologies of mercantilism and the balance of power.

William Shaler's six essays confirm that their author was an ideologue and an expansionist. He
was also a New England merchant with a taste for diplomacy, and that background too shaped his vision of the future growth of the trade and the boundaries of the United States. Shaler envisaged a republic that would include California, Canada, and Florida, but he displayed no comparable interest in Texas, and he was indifferent about Cuba joining the Union so long as the island remained free from European influence. These preferences, along with his desire for a partnership with Great Britain to create a new balance of power as a source of international stability, characterize Shaler as a uniquely interesting thinker. His essays suggest that he borrowed and reshaped ideas about the mid-eighteenth century European balance of power in order to project them on to both the Americas and the world at large as a way of reorganizing the collapsing Spanish empire and thereby establish a new and peaceful world order. In that sense, he was not an apostle of Pan-Americanism, nor was he an "advance agent" of the United States as a world power.

Essay I “No. 1 ‘Essays on the Revolution in So. America’”

On the occurrence of great events tending in their nature to change the political & commercial relations of civilized States with each other, it becomes the duty of independent nations to guard by every means consistent with justice and honor, against the effects of such events, that menace their peace and national rights. Such is the nature and tendency of the Spanish revolution. Whether a Bourbon, a Braganza, or a Bonaparte reign in the peninsulae of Spain may be [a] matter of very serious consideration with the nations of Europe, but to the U. S. it must be indifferent: as it cannot change their relations with that country in a degree to justify any interference on their part. But on crossing the Atlantic this revolution changes its character, as it relates to the U. S. and involves in its course their future peace & prosperity. The consequences of the establishment of a number of independent Republics on this continent in the whole space comprehended between Louisiana & Patagonia, where the same language will be spoken, and the same laws govern, seem to defy the grasp of the human mind:
I confess that I cannot pretend to estimate their extent. I will therefore leave the Spanish Americans beyond the I[s]tmus of Darien to manage their Affairs in the best manner they can, and will use my humble endeavors to point out to my country men some general points where I think the national interests and honor of the U. S. are deeply involved in the consequences of the Revolution in the Spanish dominions on this side of the Istmus. The best Authorities show the following to have been the population of the Kingdom of New Spain commonly called Mexico in the year 1808. Viz

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>74,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creoles</td>
<td>1,010,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pure Indians</td>
<td>2,320,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed breed</td>
<td>2,595,000</td>
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Total: 5,999,300 souls.

Two thirds of this population may be termed civilized, the whole is susceptible of becoming so, & consequently of contributing to the aggregate of human perfection and happiness. Cold and unfeeling must be the A[merica]n heart who would regard them in no other light than as degraded dependents of Spain. This population is also spread over an extensive country supposed to surpass all others in natural resources; they are our near neighbors, & may become usefull friends, or inconvenient, even dangerous ennemies, according to the policy we observe towards them. In this interesting country the revolution now ranges with circumstances of violence and public misery allmost without a parallell in History, unless it be found in that of the wars of Cortes and Pizarro. The Spanish government feeling their incapacity to quell this Rebellion have applied to their Allies, who have by treaty agreed to mediate between the insurgent provinces and their Metropolis, and eventually for valuable considerations to guarantee the integrity of the Spanish Monarchy on this continent.

It is not necessary to calculate here the ability of great Britain to execute the provisions of this treaty, it is sufficient for my argument that a government who has subjugated India, and who openly aspires to the exclusive commerce of the world has made such a contract. But the revolution in Mexico
has gone too far for mediation. Consequently British Bayonettes must be employed to reduce and disarm the insurgents; and when that insurrection is thus quelled, who will be the real masters of that country? Will any man in his right senses pretend that the imbecille government of Spain will then have any Authority there? No; a British Chief will dictate laws to, and controul the policy of Mexico; and to suppose that, then the resources of New Spain, will not be turned against the U. S. is extravagant.

It is thus indispensably necessary that the American people interfere in this interesting Struggle; their honor, their interests, humanity, require it. It is time to set a boundary to the Ambition of Europe: this continent was not created for their sole convenience: much nobler destinies I trust await it.

It is understood on good authority that the Mexicans are unanimous for independence, but they are without arms and without organization. We have the means of supplying those wants. An Auxiliary Army of 5000 regular troops, as many volunteers, and 50,000 stand of arms, would enable them to consummate their independence and to place themselves in a situation to defy the utmost efforts of its enemies. Then would free and independent Mexico be our friend from the strongest of all considerations, gratitude and a common interest; then should we be amply remunerated for our generous efforts by the good will of a people become free thro' us and by the advantages of an extensive, a peacefull, and a mutually beneficial commerce.

**Essay II “No. 2. Essay on the Revolution in So. America”**

A portion of the Spanish Dominions more immediately interesting to the U. S. and not less critically situated than Mexico is the Island of Cuba. The consequences of the treaty of guarantie apply to this Island with even more propriety than any other Spanish Colony. Its great intrinsic & relative value render it an object of peculiar Solicitude to France and England as well as Spain. It may be occupied by an expedition from France; it may be the object of the great armament in the Scheldt. To prevent which and the possibility of a popular insurrection it may be thought expedient by the Regency
that the British should occupy it. Either contingency is equally fatal to us. But to enable my countrymen to estimate how deeply their interests are involved in the fate of Cuba it will be necessary to enter into some detail on the Physical and relative importance of this Valuable Island.

The Island of Cuba covers a space of about seven hundred miles in length and ninety miles in breadth, between the peninsulas of Florida and Yucatan; it is estimated to contain 30,215,266 acres of Cultivable lands of unparalleled fertility, about 3,333,000 acres of which are in a state of improvement. It possesses a great number of Commodious bays and harbors fit for the reception of all Kinds of shipping, among others Havana on the north side and Santiago de Cuba on the south side are impregnably fortified and possess all the natural advantages requisite for the establishment of great naval depôts. The forests of the Island furnish an unlimited supply of as fine timber for naval construction as any in the world: no timber has been allowed to be felled without Special permission from the Marine department, as in all grants of land the timber proper for naval construction has ever been reserved to the Crown. From the peculiar situation of this Island it completely commands the navigation of the Mexican Gulph and the Bahama passages. The transit from the northern ports to any port in the Gulph of Mexico, to the Mississippi, to W. and E. Florida, to the coasts of Georgia and So Carolina, is allways sure; and in common weather from three to ten days. From the southern ports to Jamaica or any part of the Main So. of Yucatan the transit is equally easy & Certain.

Hence Cuba has with strict propriety obtained the expressive appellation of Key to the Spanish continental provinces. The Climate is generally very healthy: in Havana and in Santiago de Cuba the yellow fever prevails in the hot months but it is probably owing in a great measure to those cities being too compactly built; to their being surrounded by high walls and fortresses, and also to their very defective police. The mercury never rises above 90° and the nights are allways delightfully cool and refreshing. From the best authorities Cuba contains about 600,000 inhabitants--100,000 of which are black and 110,000 are contained in Havana and its neighbouring Villages. The natives are remarkable for
the robustness and vigor of their constitutions; they are very temperate, are excellent horsemen, and seem to possess the qualities requisite to form good citizens and soldiers. Innumerable herds of cattle, horses, mules and swine are bred in the interior, and might be exported with advantage if that branch of trade were permitted & encouraged: of these the horses and mules are remarkable for their indefatigable activity. By the returns of the custom house of Havana in 1810 10,000,000 lbs of Coffee and 746,608 quintals of sugar were exported in that year, and in the same their revenues amounted to 3,200,000 dollars three fourths of which were derived from import duties. Exportation is free. In the present state of things Cuba depends on the U. S. for flour and ordinary lumber: the consumption of the former has since the year of the general embargo been reduced from 90,000 to 60,000 barrils. But if this Island should fall into the hands of a power who had an object in rendering it independent of its neighbors, by giving a proper stimulus to industry & encouraging immigration, not only flour but all the necessaries of life equal to its own consumption might be produced without great prejudice to its more precious branches of agriculture.

It follows from the forgoing that the Island of Cuba possesses resources for agriculture and commerce unequalled by any portion of the globe of the same extent, that we are acquainted with, and which if in the hands of England or France, and turned to the terrible purposes of war, might render them masters of the American coasts from Charlestown to Darien. Havana would become a great naval station, that would give them the complete command of those seas; not a boat could leave the Mississippi and enter it without their License. It would also be the headquarters of a moveable army, always ready to be transported to any point required, to abet rebellion or depredate on our maritime settlements. Their influence over New Spain would also then enable them to controul their policy, and wrest from us our late acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida. Even a division of our Union might then be affected and our prospects of future happiness and political grandeur blasted in the blossom. I will now endeavor to reverse the picture, and show what would be the influence of Cuba in our hands, or
under our immediate controul. The Maritime Superiority of our ennemy would be parylized; Mexico would be safe; our coasts would be effectually secured from blockade or depredation, and the trade of our ennemy in those seas at our mercy: England or indeed any power could not then make war on us with any prospect of advantage; and finally our Union with all its important consequences would be secured forever.

Essay III [untitled]

No 3 Could the Island of Cuba remain in the hands of its present possessors, altho' not the most amicable of neigbours, their torpid character and weak government would never excite our apprehension: the development of their agricultural & commercial resources would be usefull to us; a necessary intercourse, would make us better acquainted with each other, and we would gradually form the most intimate and friendly relations: we should become mutually usefull, and they would form a barrier against any of the hostile interprizes before enumerated. But from the course the revolution has taken it seems impossible that Spain can preserve her important American Colonies. The inhabitants of Cuba have as yet remained quiet & faithfull to their Metropolis. They have however not been blind to their situation; their commerce has been flourishing and until lately they have found a good market for their produce in the U. S.: in short they have been well off, and wisely determined while they were so not to anticipate events. They are sensible that according to the natural course of things this turn must come, and it is the opinion of the men of the most wisdom & influence among them, that when the day arrives, they ought to seek the protection and alliance of the U. S. as their natural friends. I am well persuaded, indeed, I am assured that they will never submit to pass into the hands of any other European power without a bloody struggle. The numbers of regular Spanish troops in Cuba is very inconsiderable[,] probably not 5000 men distributed over the whole Island, but they have a numerous militia, detachments from which are constantly in service, and I am well assured that they can if occasion
requires it bring 40,000 men into the field, which in such a climate are sufficient for defensive war. They expect that England will make an attempt, on some specious pretext of protection to occupy and garrison Havana, which they are determined to resist and to apply to the United States for assistance. This contingency seems inevitable in case of war between the U. S. and Great Britain. In such a crisis they would require from us, arms, ammunition and money and probably an auxiliary regular force, which it will most undoubtably be the policy of the American people to furnish with a liberal hand.

Then whether Cuba form a part of the Mexican Empire, whether it be an independent State, or whether it be incorporated into our Union ought not in good policy to be an object of great solicitude with us; by destroying their dependence on Europe we secure and consolidate both our interests and theirs; the choice may be with the utmost safety be deferred to them, for neither of the former are incompatible with our interests: Our policy as it relates to Europe must ever be the same. But it is in every manner probable that they would spontaneously prefer the latter, for with Mexico they have no interests in common, except language, laws, & religion, and many years must elapse before that country can acquire a sufficient degree of consistency at home and respectability abroad to insure tranquility and protection to a distant insular province of that importance; and at present at least Cuba does not possess the means necessary to form a respectable political corps, and to maintain her independence among nations without foreign aid.

**Essay IV “Notes on Manners and Society in Havana Cuba”**

The people of Cuba are by no means deficient in genius. The free intercourse they have enjoyed of late years with foreigners, has given them a glimpse of civilization by partially removing the gloomy Veil thrown over their minds by a barbarous government and superstitious Religion. The proud Spaniard from Europe still struts, in all the fancied superiority of birth and office, and monks parade the streets surrounded by all the solemn pageantry of their profession; but the first no longer enjoy their
supremacy uncontested, and the holy character of the latter no longer shields them from the shafts of ridicule and satyre. The Creole looses no opportunity of asserting his equality with the European, and the Priest is often reminded that other countries are powerfull and happy under entire religious freedom. The clumsy furniture of old times, and the barbarous representations of Saints & Virgins, are fast giving place to the elegant conveniences, and decorations of their neighbors, & even the national Olla podrida often cedes to the soups & culinary refinements of their late hosts. In fact there has been a rapid progress towards improvement for the last fifteen or twenty years. It may however be observed that they have all the vices of the decrepitude of society, without a due proportion of the vigorous virtues of its youth. Accustomed to dissimulation, by a monkish education, they seldom express their real sentiments, on any occasion. And never having been accustomed to see justice administered for Justices sake but to attain it through the labyrinths of intrigue and favor, which they emphatically term by Empeños. If a man has a case pending in law, he surrounds the judges and assessors with the solicitations of his friends, from the congregate powers of whose interests he expects more than from the goodness of his cause. The consequence is, the most powerful gains, and justice sleeps.

From the above Causes the men in power, who have allways been sent from Spain, altho' frequently of despicable talents & corrupt morals, are sure to be surrounded by a cloud of clients, who give them an influence in society to which they have no well founded claim. Hence the meanness and dissimulation that very generally characterizes the inhabitants of Havana. The Creoles, altho idle and dissipated, have a genius and taste for poetry which circumstances considered they cultivate with success. Social intercourse in Havana offers few intellectual charms or resources. The men are badly educated and uninformed, and the science of the ladies seldom extends beyond knowing how to read. A predeliction for Vulgar dissipation seems to be the consequence. A passion for gambling pervades all ranks and classes of society. It is not uncommon to see fathers and mothers, with their sons & daughters, with Marquises, counts, generals, monks, and Vulgar peasants sporting at the same table.
Whether it be from pride, indolence or prejudice, the Creoles seldom engage in commercial pursuits. Some have distinguished themselves in the Armies, others drone away their lives in the church, and many have risen to eminence in the law, but a far greater number do nothing useful, and pass their insignificant lives in gambling, & dissipation. An ambition for more noble pursuits has however lately been excited by the return of several young gentlemen, who have been educated in the U. S. and gives reason to believe that under a liberal government & enlightened system of policy the natives of Cuba would very soon take the rank among men that nature has so well qualified them to hold. The country people or peasantry are equally addicted to gambling and dissipation. They are a hardy athletic race, sober and capable of enduring the extremest fatigue; they are excellent horsemen, always go armed with a good sabre of country manufacture called a machete, are obliging and civil, but defend themselves with courage and address if attacked or insulted. They are totally ignorant, and too indolent to cultivate the fertile lands they inhabit.

The people of Cuba have no taste for agriculture or rural pursuits, they never live in the country but from Necessity. They are however very fond of country parties on particular festivals, where they proceed in large parties from Estate to Estate during a month or six weeks when they are expensively entertained by their proprietors on provisions brought from towns for the purpose. Gambling is always a principal object of these excursions. The rapid progress made in agriculture of late years, particularly in the culture of coffee is entirely due to the policy of permitting the French and other foreigners to improve their lands. As that policy ceased with their revolution they have already ceased to progress, and will probably remain where they are, if they do not retrograde unless there is another political change.

The Europeans monopolize, the power, commerce, mechanic Arts, and industry generally in Cuba. They consequently have kept the Creoles in a degrading dependence, which they seem now disposed to rise out of, and if assisted by circumstances they may perhaps effect their laudable
intentions. The Europeans regarding Cuba as their patrimony have ever been opposed to the toleration of foreigners among them, even foreign commerce they regard with malignant jealousy: they claim a monopoly in all things. Several American and other foreign artists have of late years fixed here to the great benefit of the mechanic Arts; but they are constantly persecuted, petition after petition, has been presented to the government to expell them, and they are not now without apprehensions of being driven out. The Creoles of fortune very generally study the french language, which however they seldom speak well. The french are almost the only foreign Authors they are acquainted with. The wars that Spain has been so constantly drawn into in Europe, and so contrary to her dignity and interests; the many instances of injustice, oppression, and humiliation they have suffered from both france & England, while they have broken down the national spirit, and destroyed all confidence in their own prowess, have generated a deeprooted hatred to both those nations. They trust none of their professions, and view all their operations with suspicion and jealousy. They view the people of the U. S. with less distrust and disapprobation than they do any other, notwithstanding the pains that ever have been taken to depreciate in their estimation our national character and political importance. They receive from our hands their improvements; their fashions in furniture, in equipage, and in dress; their youth are much more frequently sent to our seminaries for education than to any other; and our markets are the sole, where for many years they have been accustomed to look for the sale of their produce, and a supply of the necessaries and conveniences of life. Thus have the U. S. insensibly become to be regarded in Cuba allmost as their Metropolis. American politics excite much more interest in their minds than do those of Europe.

Essay V “Reflections on the means of restoring the political ballance and procuring a general peace to the world”

I have ever believed that common justice on the part of England, and a due appreciation of the
political importance of the U. S. would prevent war with them; I am confident that she will severely feel its effects; I believe that the declaration of War by us, will restore her to her senses; and that a ministry such as may be formed in England will be desirous of restoring harmony between two states that seem destined by Providence to be the guardians of the liberties of mankind. I therefore humbly submit to the reflections of the wise, the following outlines of a plan for a general pacification. The points it embraces are new, perhaps extravagant, but as hints I flatter myself they may be useful, and susceptible of great improvement. The present situation of the civilized world is new: History presents us with no semblance of it: latent principles either unknown, or disregarded before, spring up with Vigor and activity, and seem irresistibly to claim the attention of the statesman and the Philosopher.

The political ballance in Europe being irrecoverably destroyed by the humiliation of the great states on the continent, and the incorporation of the minor ones into the French Empire; and the rule of the Ocean usurped and maintained by Great Britain; the whole civilized world seems on the point of being forced into a contest against their consent, and against their interests, the object of which seems to be to ascertain from which of the two great powers they may quietly receive laws. It seems impossible according to the immutable laws of nature that the weak must cede to the strong, that the political ballance can again be restored in Europe. The resources and courage of England will struggle in vain against the power of France on the continent; they may for a time retard the catastrophe, but they must finally cede and leave the French Emperor master of the Peninsulae of Spain. Neither does it seem probable that Russia can oppose any effectual resistance to the overwhelming power of France, and prevent her from organizing the turkish Empire and turning its immense resources to the accomplishment of her views of Universal dominion. England alone in this old world seems to rise in the Majesty of her strength & oppose an insurmountable barrier to the destructive ambition of Napoleon. England alone in the eyes of every reflecting man is the sole dike between him and universal dominion at least in Europe. But England under the controul of an infatuated ministry and an imbecille
prince makes an abuse of the advantages of her situation; and instead of being a consolation and blessing to mankind she violates in the most wanton manner the sovereign rights of other states: the same rights that she pretends to be herself contending for, and renders her influence even more abhorrible than that of France. In this state of things what can be done? what should be the policy of the U. S.? Their rights are trampled on, and their feelings insulted by both England and France: they have allmost equal cause of war with both of those unjust powers. A Union with the latter would probably be the ruin of the former, which would leave them in the necessity of subscribing unconditionally to the plans of France, or to engage in war with her single handed. But it appears that if England were governed by wise councils, that a coalition might be formed with the american confederation that would insure the safety of both states, and leave France not only in possession of her power but under it beneficial to the World. As the independence of European Spain is absolutely unattainable, it should be abandoned as such: all treaties having that object in view should be considered as null. There is no dishonor in abandoning an impracticable object, and there are other interests still existing which if properly fostered and managed may again restore the political ballance, and give peace to mankind. The Spanish and Portuguese Colonies in America contain an active population of more than twelve million of souls besides Indians; those countries abound in provisions; timber; in every species of raw material; and the precious metals: their soil, climate, sea coasts, bays and harbors, seem to mark them as destined by nature to favor the greatest development of human industry if they were freed from the shackles of barbarism and ignorance, and under the influence of wise and patriotic governments. The Union in friendship of England and the U. S. and consequent action in concert of those two powers would cause discord to cease in those fine countries; would give the people the full liberty to chuse and organize such forms of government as best suit their manners, habits, and local circumstances; and finally to unite them in a grand confederation on principles best calculated to insure their own happiness and the peace of the world. This confederation should be formed on principles that
remove forever every political jealousy. England may have a fair claim to such indemnities as shall give complete security to her possessions in the East and West Indies; and the U. S. require the same for the security and future peace of the Union. It is therefore presumed that a treaty formed on the following basis would attain and secure the objects desired. Viz. Article 1. The provinces of the Canadas; Nova Scotia; the Island of Cuba; and the Florida's with their respective dependencies shall be forever united to the American Confederation.

Article 2. A portion of Brasil beginning at a convenient boundary south of the river amazons and extending north and west to the southern limits of French Guiana; the Islands of Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo; and the Philipine Islands with their respective dependencies shall forever be united to the British Empire.

Article 3. The remaining Spanish provinces on the Continent of America shall be united into Sovereign independent States, under such forms of government as their respective inhabitants shall elect, and their independence forever guarantied by the contracting parties. Their inhabitants shall be invited to adopt the following political limits as the most natural Viz.

1. The provinces north and west of the Istmus of Darien to form a sovereign state.

2. The provinces lying on the atlantic from the Istmus of Darien to the western limits of Dutch Guiana, and on the pacific ocean from the same Istmus of the S.E. limits of the Province of Quito to form a sovereign state.

3. The remainder of the Provinces forming the Vice Royalty of Peru in their whole extent to form a sovereign state.

4. The Vice Royalty of Buenos Ayres and the Captaincy General of Chili to form a sovereign state.

The Contracting parties pretend not to meddle with or interfere in the political or civil concerns of the above mentioned states, further than at their request to furnish them with the necessary aid to
prevent every foreign power whatever from a similar interference. But they shall be invited to join in a
grand confederation for the purpose of securing the great interests embraced in this treaty; and shall not
but by common consent make a separate peace with the common enemy during the present War.

Observations on the foregoing Treaty.

1. As the Canadas must be regarded as at the mercy of the U. S.; as they are necessary to the
future peace and security of the Union; and as in the hands of England they will ever be considered as a
germ of War, it is believed that no insurmountable objection [to] their cession can be made. Nova Scotia
may be a subject of more discussion from the probability of its being regarded as necessary to the
prosperity of the British fisheries.

Cuba is certainly of incalculable Value and importance; if it is duly appreciated objections will
certainly be made to its cession, to obviate which an arrangement may be made for its intire
independence, which if properly secured would be as beneficial to the U. S. as its incorporation into the
Union. To the cession of the Floridas no objection is foreseen. It may also be observed that the great
and important acquisitions that will naturally fall to England in the European and African Seas; such as
Cyprus; Candia; Sicily; Sardinia; the Belearic Islands; the Azores; the Canaries &c ought to annull any
jealousy she might feel at the acquisitions of power to the U. S. contemplated in this arrangement.

2. The command of the navigation of the Amazons gives England the most complete security
for her southern continental possessions; and may also be regarded as a very important source of
commercial prosperity. The Islands of Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo, considered as colonies, are of
incalculable importance.

The Philipine Islands are necessary to the security of the British Empire in the East; besides their
importance as territorial possessions of the greatest value, they will give to G.B. the command of the
most important commerce with Mexico, Peru, and Chili. The only objection foreseen to this cession is,
that it can be obtained without our consent.

It may be objected that these cessions are made at the expense of the Spanish monarchy, the ally of England, but in reply it may be observed that this arrangement is predicated on the necessary conquest of Spain & Portugal, where those portions of territory however valuable they may be, must be regarded as a derelict: they belong to no one, unless it be to the conqueror of the Peninsulæ.

The Continental Spanish provinces have no interest in claiming them, or the means of supporting their claims if they had the interest. The Kingdom of Brasil will be amply remunerated for the inconsiderable cession required for England by the security they will acquire for the vast remains of their territory.

Those provinces which by this arrangement are created into independent states, will undoubtedly be the greatest gainers, as by it they will acquire a powerfull and competent garrantie for their independence, and every obstacle is removed to the formation of regular governments, which if they have common sense, will secure their national prosperity & happiness. Finally this arrangement secures to the U. S. their natural boundaries, and the intire command of the navigation of all their great rivers: and it is believed that it would place the confederate States in intire independence of France and oblige her to conclude a general peace on principles consistent with the future safety and independence of all parties.

**Essay VI [untitled]**

Supposing Mexico to have achieved her independence, we may without risk of error give to her the following boundaries: for they are those of Nature. On the north and east the territories of the United States formerly the province of Louisiana; on the east and south the bays of Mexico, of Honduras, of Nicaragua, and the Istmus of Darien; and on the west the Pacific Ocean. That Empire will then be composed of the Vice Royalty of New Spain proper; of the internal provinces; of Yucatan; of
Guatamala; and of California: and will contain between seven and eight million of souls.

Those countries abound with every species of raw material; they will consume annually an immense amount of manufactures; and will consequently give birth to, and maintain an extensive and valuable commerce. Yet nature seems to have denied them the means of becoming a maritime power of any importance: it appears that they can have no well founded motive for turning their attention to maritime pursuits. Their harbors on either ocean are not good and are all in unhealthy situations and torrid climates; they have no fisheries, and a very little coasting trade, consequently few Seamen. Their abundant mines, and productive soil must for ages divert their attention from the Ocean, indeed it does not appear possible that they can ever become respectable on that element. It is therefore probable that they will at least for the present not think of fostering a national navigation. It has been a question with great Statesmen whether any nation ought in good policy to do so: if such an argument is at all founded, it applies in a peculiar manner to Mexico. It therefore follows that she will grant to foreign flags the utmost liberty on all her coasts, which will offer to the maritime commerce of the United States the most inexhaustable means of extension, by carrying her raw materials to the markets of Asia, and of Europe, and furnishing her with the necessary Supplies of our own and the manufactures of those countries. These advantages we shall of course on the Atlantic coasts of Mexico divide with the maritime powers of Europe; but in the Pacific Ocean we may be without a rival.

The cottons of our Southern States & territories and the lead of the Mississippi may be exported to China, and the proceeds returned in Manufactures to New Spain with great benefit. The Columbia river belongs to the United States by every right of property ever alleged in such cases; we discovered it, we explored it, and by our old charters, and the purchase of Louisiana, we prevent the claims of any other government: nothing but actual possession is required to make our right a perfect one. Allready have our enterprizing citizens begun a settlement at the mouth of that river, its Shores and those of the Missouri are becoming familiar to us, and it is ascertained that the communication between the

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headwaters of those great rivers is not only practicable but easy: that settlement will consequently soon rise to an importance that will require the attention and protecting care of the government, when the establishment of a garrison and customs house at the mouth of the Columbia will become Necessary. This by giving a home and a resting place to our enterprising navigators would be an important step towards obtaining the maritime trade of those immense Countries; but other considerations equally important are by the events of the times offered to our Acceptance as parts of the plan.

The Russian settlements of the N.W. coast of America have been silently progressing for a series of years: under the reign of the wise Catherine they received great encouragement. Their principal factory is on the Island of Kodiac; they have another important one at Onalaski, and have also extended their settlements as far down as the coast as Cooks river. The court of Madrid became allarmed at their progress and founded the Missions and garrisons of Upper California as a barrier against their enterprizes. By a subsequent treaty Prince Williams Sound was fixed on as the boundary between the two nations. In the years 1804 or 1805 two ships were sent from St. Petersburg to visit these American settlements, the first of that nation that ever went there direct from Europe, and there is every reason to believe that if Russia should be able to clear herself from her European embarrassments She will aim at maritime importance in the pacific Ocean through her settlements on the N. W. coast of America. California cannot have escaped her attention, it may already have become a condition in a treaty with the government of Cadiz, at all events on the breaking up of the Spanish Monarchy in America it seems probable that Russia will either by treaty or by force seek to possess herself of that Obscure, but fertile and valuable territory, which under a wise and active administration, would give her the means of acquiring a decided maritime preponderance on that Ocean, and of obtaining the coasting trade from California to Chili.

The coast of California will be found accurately described in an Article published in the 3d. Volume of the American Register. Lower California or the peninsula proper up to the port of San
Diego in about the 32o of north latitude is nearly uninhabitable from its extreme Sterility and want of water; it produces nothing useful but salt, except the Silver mines of some account at the points, and the pearl fishery which is not important. The coast above to the river San Francisco in about the 40o of Latitude, is of extraordinary fertility, tolerably well watered, and possesses several good harbors; it is also well stocked with choice breeds of Horses, horned cattle, Sheep, goats, and hogs; it is settled by from 3000 to 5000 Spanish inhabitants besides Indians, and has a force of about 500 men distributed in four posts and many missions: All the fruits and grains of Europe have been introduced there and produce abundantly: wine is made in all the Missions.

Upper California in all its relations with Mexico must be considered as a distant colony; it is separate from the nearest Mexican settlements by an immense tract of country, uninhabited except by nations of barbarous Indians, which in the common course of things cannot be joined to it, by civilization and settlement for many years to come: as yet there has been no communication between those countries but by sea and from the winds blowing constantly from the N.W. The shortest passages from the nearest Mexican port are rarely under 40 days. Therefore the only solicitude that Mexico can feel respecting California will be that it should not fall into possession of one of the great maritime powers of Europe: of the U. S. the same jealousy would not be entertained, our interests in all our foreign relations must be nearly the same as theirs will be, and she ought to regard our establishments and maritime power on the Pacific Ocean with pleasure, as a sure guarantie against the ambition of Europe. Therefore in the aforementioned Contingency it seems that the cession of California to the U. S. might be obtained without difficulty from Mexico, to which the communication would be sure, and in time easy through the Columbia & Missouri. When by the fisheries, and coasting trade of that extensive coast; the trade to Asia, and the fur trade of the N.W. Coast, an important nursery for Seamen would be formed; we should be able completely to develop the resources of the western portion of our Empire; to lay a foundation for a commerce on that ocean, which at no distant day may become equal to that we
enjoy on the Atlantic; and give us a preponderance there that no European power could ever shake.

No notice has been taken of either England or France in the foregoing from a belief that their ambition and resources are so well known as to make it quite unnecessary.

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* J.C.A. Stagg is professor of history and editor of The Papers of James Madison at the University of Virginia. For their cooperation and kind permission to reproduce the William Shaler essays in their possession, thanks are due to the staffs of the Gilder Lehrman Collection in the Pierpont Morgan Library and the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.


4 Ibid.

5 The first 4 of these essays are located in the first of 3 letterbooks kept by Shaler that now form part of the Gilder Lehrman Collection in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York City. These essays were copied into the letterbook between Jan. 7 and Mar. 9, 1812. A copy of the fifth essay, dated Aug. 18, 1812, is also in that letterbook; the recipient's copy can be found in Communications from Special Agents of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D. C. The sixth essay is in the William Jones Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP), Philadelphia.

6 Robert Smith to Shaler, June 16, 1810, Shaler Family Papers, HSP; Smith to Shaler, June 18, 1810, William Shaler Papers, HSP.

7 Smith to Shaler, June 16, 18, 1810, Shaler Family Papers, HSP.

8 Shaler to Robert Smith, June 21, 1810, Communications from Special Agents.

9 Shaler to Smith, Dec. 4, 1810, Consular Dispatches of the Department of State, Havana, Record Group 59, National Archives.

10 See, for example, Shaler to Smith, Aug. 28, 1810, Communications from Special Agents, and Shaler to Smith, Oct. 24, 1810, Consular Dispatches . . . Havana. Among the more interesting items forwarded by Shaler while on the Mexican leg of his mission was a 50-page translation headed "Memoir: Statistical and political on the four eastern Internal Provinces of New Spain presented to the General and extraordinary Cortes assembled in Cadiz, by Doctor Don Miguel Ramos de Arispe representative in the Cortes from the province of Cohahuila" in Nov. 1811. Shaler enclosed this document in his May 10, 1813, letter to Samuel Dana "for the information of the government"; Simon Gratz Autograph Collection, HSP. For a modern annotated translation, see Nettie Lee Benson, ed., *Report that Dr. Miguel Ramos de Arispe . . . Presents to the August Congress on the Natural, Political and Civil Condition of the Provinces of Coahuila, Nuevo Léon, Nuevo Santander, and Texas of the Four Eastern Interior Provinces of the Kingdom of Mexico* (Austin, Tex., 1950).
Consular Dispatches . . . Havana.

Shaler to James Monroe, Nov. 25, 1811, ibid. This letter was followed by a series of biographical sketches of the leading officials and citizens of Cuba, containing whatever information Shaler had been able to glean about their background. He paid particular attention to the question of whether their political beliefs were likely to predispose them to favor France, Great Britain, or the U. S. in the event of Spain's fall. Similar sketches can be found throughout Shaler's correspondence with the State Department, and he presumably compiled them in accordance with the instructions he had received in 1810.

Shaler to Monroe, Nov. 25, 1811, Consular Dispatches . . . Havana.


Claiborne to Hamilton, Feb. 1, 1812, ibid., 45.

None of the first 4 essays reached Washington. Very likely they miscarried in the mails, a probability suggested by Claiborne's report that "Three successive Mails having failed, we remain without any recent intelligence from Washington"; Claiborne to Hamilton, Feb. 17, 1812, ibid., 57. Claiborne, nevertheless, had already transmitted to Washington summaries of the contents of Shaler's first and second essays in his letters to Paul Hamilton, Dec. 26, 1811, Jan. 3, 1812, ibid., 21-22, 28.

Shaler to Monroe, Aug. 18, 1812, Communications from Special Agents.


Nichols, Advance Agents of American Destiny, 104-06.


Ibid., 251, 253.

For Bolivar's 1813 scheme, see Vicente Lecuna, comp., and Harold A. Bierck, ed., Selected Writings of Bolivar, 2 vols. (New York, 1951), 1:57. For a discussion of the defining features of Pan-Americanism, especially the belief that all American states must be completely free of European attachments and unwilling to tolerate European interference in their concerns, see Lockey, Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings (New York, 1920), 33-35.

Shaler to William Jones, July 18, 1813, William Jones Papers, HSP.


Ibid., 160.
28 Ibid., 160-61.


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31 In May 1811, the British government, irritated by the refusal of the Spanish regency to open markets in Spanish America, offered to mediate between Spain and its colonies in return for trade concessions and other considerations. The Cortes agreed to consider the proposal in return for a loan of £10,000,000; see William W. Kaufmann, British Policy and the Independence of Latin America, 1804-1828 (New Haven, 1951), 66-68. The news was reported in the (Washington) National Intelligencer, Oct. 31, 1811.

32 Reprinted by permission from Gilder Lehrman Collection in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York City.

33 The (Baltimore)Weekly Register, Oct. 19, 26, 1811, printed reports on Napoleon’s efforts to rebuild the French navy at Antwerp since the Battle of Trafalgar, including the prediction that France would shortly put 150 ships of the line to sea; see Richard Glover, “The French Fleet, 1807-1814: Britain's Problem; and Madison's Opportunity,” Journal of Modern History, 39 (1967), 233-52.

34 Reprinted by permission from Gilder Lehrman Collection in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York City.

35 Reprinted by permission from Gilder Lehrman Collection in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York City.

36 A dish of boiled meats.

37 By obligation or, possibly, by means of a protector or patron.

38 Shaler appears to have omitted a word here.

39 Reprinted by permission from Gilder Lehrman Collection in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York City. The essay's title is taken from the Gilder Lehrman description.

40 Reprinted by permission from William Jones Papers, HSP.

41 Shaler referred to Astoria, established by John Jacob Astor in 1811; see James P. Ronda, A storia and Empire (Lincoln, Neb., 1990), 37-64, 87-115.

42 Unalaska Island, Alaska.

43 According to Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast, 2 vols. (New York, [1882]), 2:319, "There was never any definite settlement of boundaries between Spain and Russia. The former claimed that her possessions extended to Prince William Sound, and the latter at times extended her claims to the Columbia; but the respective claims were not zealously urged." After 1750, Spanish officials worried about Russian designs in the Pacific, and in 1768 José de Galvez planned the reorganization of the Interior Provinces of Mexico, including the establishment of mission stations in Alta California. These measures were
followed by expeditions against Russian settlements in Alaska, but in 1789 Catherine II assured Madrid that she had told "expeditionaries from Kamchatka not to establish themselves at any point belonging to another power." In 1801, Russia and Spain agreed "to re-establish the commercial relations between the two countries, on the footing in which they were before the war, as far as possible." See also Warren L. Cook, Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819 (New Haven, 1973), 41-84, 114-36, 196, 271-89, 303-21, 427-32, and "Treaty of Peace between the French Republic and the Emperor of all the Russias," State Papers, Annual Register . . . for the Year 1801 (London, 1802), 291-92.

44 In a treaty signed in July 1812, Tsar Alexander I recognized the Spanish regency and made an alliance to promote trade and the prosecution of the war against France. The treaty did not contain any article pertaining to California; see Russell H. Bartley, Imperial Russia and the Struggle for Latin American Independence, 1808-1828 (Austin, Tex., 1978), 98-101. See note 26 above.

45 See note 26 above.